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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici curiae are law professors who have studied 
the history of the dual sovereignty doctrine. The 
purpose of this brief is to provide the Court with ad-
ditional historical information that will be useful in 
reconsidering dual sovereignty.1 
Stuart Banner is the Norman Abrams Distin-
guished Professor of Law at UCLA. 
Paul G. Cassell is the Ronald N. Boyce Presiden-
tial Professor of Criminal Law and the University 
Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of 
Utah. 
Anthony Colangelo is the Gerald J. Ford Research 
Fellow and a Professor of Law at SMU. 
Evan Lee is Emeritus Professor of Law at UC 
Hastings. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner’s brief demonstrates that there was no 
dual sovereignty doctrine before the mid-19th centu-
ry. At the Founding and for several decades thereaf-
ter, a prosecution by one sovereign was understood 
to bar a subsequent prosecution by all other sover-
eigns. Dual sovereignty is thus contrary to the origi-
nal meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Defend-
ants today enjoy a weaker form of double jeopardy 
protection than they did when the Bill of Rights was 
ratified. 
                                                 
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, 
and no person other than amici made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. 
Both parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 









But that fact only raises three further questions. 
First why did the Court erroneously conclude in 
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131 (1959), that the 
English and early American sources are “totally in-
conclusive” as to whether dual sovereignty existed at 
the Founding? Second, how, when, and why did the 
dual sovereignty doctrine come to exist? Third, given 
this history, why did the Court hold in United States 
v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922), that a state prosecu-
tion does not bar a subsequent federal prosecution 
for the same conduct? This brief will answer these 
questions. 
First, in Bartkus the Court simply misunderstood 
the English and early American sources. 
Second, dual sovereignty grew out of the intense 
controversy over slavery in the period immediately 
before the Civil War. The Court invented dual sover-
eignty largely to prevent free states from blocking 
the recapture of fugitive slaves. 
Third, by the time of Lanza, the dual sovereignty 
doctrine had been restated so often that the original 
meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause had been 
forgotten. In Lanza, in any event, the Court was less 
concerned with original meaning than with rampant 
disregard for Prohibition. One purpose of dual sover-
eignty was to prevent “wet” localities from nullifying 
the Volstead Act. 
In short, dual sovereignty is an accident of histo-
ry. It was not part of the constitutional design.  
  










Dual sovereignty is an accident of history; it 
was not part of the constitutional design. 
A.  In Bartkus v. Illinois, the Court misun-
derstood the English and early American 
sources relevant to the origin of dual 
sovereignty. 
The Court has examined the early sources rele-
vant to the origin of dual sovereignty on only one oc-
casion. In Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), 
the Court devoted two paragraphs to the early 
sources, and concluded that the historical record is 
“totally inconclusive” as to whether dual sovereignty 
existed at the Founding. Id. at 131. This conclusion 
is mistaken. It rests on two major errors. 
First, the Court refused even to consider the Eng-
lish cases, R. v. Roche, 168 Eng. Rep. 169 (Cr. Cas. 
1775), and R. v. Hutchinson (1678) (which is de-
scribed in Roche, 168 Eng. Rep. at 169 n.a, and in 
several other cases). The Court simply ignored 
Roche. As for the cases describing Hutchinson, the 
Court asserted that they are “dubious”—in part be-
cause they exist in different reported versions, and 
in part because “they reflect a power of discretion 
vested in English judges not relevant to the constitu-
tional law of our federalism.” Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 
128 n.9.  
Neither of these claims stands up to scrutiny. 
Roche exists in only one reported version. 
Hutchinson is indeed described slightly differently 
by different reporters, but every version says that a 
prosecution by one sovereign bars a subsequent 
prosecution by another. See Beak v. Thyrwhit, 87 









Eng. Rep. 124, 125 (K.B. 1688); Beak v. Tyrrell, 89 
Eng. Rep. 411, 411 (K.B. 1688); Beake v. Tirrell, 90 
Eng. Rep. 379, 380 (K.B. 1688); Burrows v. Jemino, 
93 Eng. Rep. 815, 815 (K.B. 1727); Burroughs v. Ja-
mineau, 25 Eng. Rep. 235, 236 (Ch. 1727). 
And the cases do not reflect any discretion vested 
in English judges. They state a clear rule of law bar-
ring a subsequent prosecution. Had the Court been 
able to consider the English treatises along with the 
cases, the Court would have learned that the rule 
declared in the cases was repeated uniformly by 
commentators. See John Strange, A Collection of Se-
lect Cases Relating to Evidence 145 (1754); Henry 
Bathurst, The Theory of Evidence 39 (1761); 2 Timo-
thy Cunningham, The Merchant’s Lawyer 113 
(1768); Francis Buller, An Introduction to the Law 
Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius 346 (1768); Leonard 
MacNally, The Rules of Evidence on Pleas of the 
Crown 428 (1802); 1 Thomas Starkie, A Treatise on 
Criminal Pleading 301 n.h (1814); 1 Joseph Chitty, 
A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 458 (1816). 
There was nothing dubious about it. 
Second, the Bartkus Court misinterpreted Hou-
ston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1 (1820). In Houston, the 
Court considered the possibility that a defendant 
might be tried twice for the same conduct, once by a 
state court and again by a federal court. The Court 
concluded that “if the jurisdiction of the two Courts 
be concurrent, the sentence of either Court, either of 
conviction or acquittal, might be pleaded in bar of 
the prosecution before the other.” Id. at 31. In 
Bartkus, the Court erroneously concluded that Hou-
ston’s reaffirmation of the traditional one-
prosecution rule was meant to apply only in the unu-









sual circumstance in which a state imposed criminal 
sanctions for a violation of a federal criminal law, 
not in the more common circumstance in which a 
state imposed sanctions for a violation of its own 
criminal law. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 130 (referring to 
Houston, 18 U.S. at 28). In fact, Houston included no 
such limitation. The Pennsylvania statute at issue in 
Houston, which prohibited desertion from the mili-
tia, was worded similarly to the federal statute pro-
hibiting desertion, Houston, 18 U.S. at 28, but, as 
the Houston Court correctly understood, Pennsylva-
nia was enforcing one of its own criminal statutes, 
not the similarly-worded federal statute. 
The Court’s mistake in Bartkus is readily under-
standable. The purpose of Pennsylvania’s desertion 
statute was to help the federal government punish 
deserters, at a time when the federal government 
was still quite weak. To achieve that end, the Penn-
sylvania statute was “in substance, a re-enactment 
of the acts of Congress, as to the description of the 
offence.” Id. Houston accordingly explained that the 
purpose of the Pennsylvania statute was “to confer 
authority upon a State Court Martial to enforce the 
laws of the United States against delinquent militia 
men.” Id. But by using the phrase “to enforce the 
laws of the United States,” the Houston Court did 
not literally mean that Pennsylvania was enforcing a 
federal statute. Rather, the Court meant that Penn-
sylvania had added its enforcement efforts to those 
of the federal government, just as would be the case 
with similarly-worded state and federal statutes to-
day. 
Had the Barkus Court been able to consult early 
American treatises, it would have learned that Hou-









ston was uniformly understood to mean that a prose-
cution by one sovereign would bar a subsequent 
prosecution by a second sovereign. James Kent’s 
Commentaries on American Law, first published in 
1826, was the leading general treatise in the coun-
try. Kent discussed Houston at length. He explained 
that state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdic-
tion in criminal cases, and that “the sentence of ei-
ther court, whether of conviction or acquittal, might 
be pleaded in bar of the prosecution before the oth-
er.” 1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 
374 (1826). In this respect, Kent noted, criminal cas-
es were just like civil cases, in that “the judgment of 
a state court, in a civil case of concurrent jurisdic-
tion, might be pleaded in bar of an action for the 
same cause instituted in a circuit court of the United 
States.” Id. 
Specialized treatises declared the same rule. See 
William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the 
United States of America 191 (1825); Thomas Ser-
geant, Constitutional Law 278 (2d ed. 1830); Edward 
D. Mansfield, The Political Grammar of the United 
States 137 (1835); Francis Wharton, A Treatise on 
the Criminal Law of the United States 137 (1846); 
Francis Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Homicide 
in the United States 283 (1855). 
The Bartkus Court thus erred in concluding that 
there was nothing to be learned from a review of the 
English and early American sources. The Court has 
not reviewed them since. 
  









B.  Dual sovereignty was invented by this 
Court shortly before the Civil War, large-
ly as a way of preventing free states from 
blocking the recapture of fugitive slaves. 
This Court abandoned the traditional one-
prosecution rule shortly before the Civil War, in 
three cases decided between 1847 and 1852: Fox v. 
Ohio, 46 U.S. 410 (1847), United States v. Marigold, 
50 U.S. 560 (1850), and Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13 
(1852). The primary reason appears to have been the 
concern that dual sovereignty would allow free 
states to thwart the recapture of fugitive slaves. 
Fox was a state counterfeiting case in which the 
defendant argued that the federal government’s 
power to punish counterfeiting was exclusive, not 
concurrent. In support of this argument, the defend-
ant’s lawyer posited the absurd consequences that he 
argued would flow from concurrent state and federal 
jurisdiction. “[I]f the power be concurrent,” he point-
ed out, “[t]he weight of authority is decidedly in fa-
vor of the doctrine, that a conviction in either court 
is a bar to a prosecution in the other.” Fox, 46 U.S. at 
429. Whichever sovereign went first, the other sov-
ereign would be prevented from prosecuting, which 
meant that a state could take power away from the 
federal government by getting to court faster. “Both 
the legislative and judicial powers of the United 
States are thus rendered abortive,” he argued—the 
legislative power because Congress’s statute could 
not be enforced, and the judicial power because the 
federal courts would be sidelined by the state prose-
cution. Id. at 430. 
This argument highlighted a potential problem 
with the traditional rule, which was that it allowed a 









state to effectively nullify federal policy by racing to 
the courthouse and depriving the federal govern-
ment of its power to prosecute. This would not be a 
problem in the area of counterfeiting, as there were 
no states with a policy of favoring counterfeiting or 
shielding counterfeiters from the federal govern-
ment. In most areas of criminal law, the federal gov-
ernment likewise had little reason to worry that a 
state might attempt to subvert federal policy. But 
there was one very big exception—slavery. 
There was already considerable controversy be-
tween the North and the South over slavery. Much of 
the controversy concerned the efforts of northern 
states to protect runaway slaves from being captured 
and returned to slavery. Timothy S. Huebner, Liber-
ty & Union: The Civil War Era and American Consti-
tutionalism 59-61 (2016). The federal Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1793 made it a criminal offense to obstruct the 
capture of a fugitive slave, 1 Stat. 302, 305 (1793), 
but some northern states, including Pennsylvania, 
enacted statutes prohibiting the capture of fugitive 
slaves, in a deliberate effort to nullify the effect of 
the Fugitive Slave Act. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 
U.S. 539 (1842), the Court put an end to this nullifi-
cation strategy, by holding that the Fugitive Slave 
Act preempted Pennsylvania’s statute. Abolitionists 
needed an alternative strategy. 
The parade of horribles imagined by Fox’s counsel, 
soon after Prigg, was almost certainly a thinly-veiled 
reference to slavery. If a state prosecution barred a 
subsequent federal prosecution, a state wishing to 
protect fugitive slaves had an obvious alternative to 
the kind of statute Prigg had rendered off-limits. In-
stead of prohibiting the capture of fugitive slaves, 









the state could prohibit the harboring of fugitive 
slaves. If the penalty was slight, or if the defendant 
could expect to be pardoned by the state governor, 
abolitionists harboring fugitive slaves would willing-
ly surrender to state authorities. Once they were 
“prosecuted” in state court, they would be immun-
ized from federal prosecution. The federal Fugitive 
Slave Act would be rendered toothless. 
In Fox the Court thus expressed its first doubts 
about the traditional one-prosecution rule. “It is al-
most certain,” the Court noted, “that, in the benig-
nant spirit in which the institutions both of the State 
and federal systems are administered, an offender 
who should have suffered the penalties denounced 
by the one would not be subjected a second time to 
punishment by the other for acts essentially the 
same, unless indeed this might occur in instances of 
peculiar enormity, or where the public safety de-
manded extraordinary rigor.” Fox, 46 U.S. at 435. 
The Court was suggesting that the one-prosecution 
rule was a matter of government grace rather than a 
strict rule of law, and that the rule could be sus-
pended in extreme cases. The Court did not say what 
those extreme cases would look like, but it was most 
likely envisioning the circumstances that Fox’s law-
yer had imagined, cases in which a free state was 
intentionally subverting the Fugitive Slave Act. “But 
were a contrary course of policy and action either 
probable or usual,” the Court concluded—i.e., were 
double prosecutions to become the norm—“this 
would by no means justify the conclusion, that of-
fences falling within the competency of different au-
thorities to restrain or punish them would not 
properly be subjected to the consequences which 









those authorities might ordain and affix to their per-
petration.” Id. That is, regardless of whether double 
prosecution was likely or unlikely, it was lawful. 
Justice McLean defended the traditional one-
prosecution rule in a lengthy dissent. “[T]o punish 
the same act by the two governments would violate, 
not only the common principles of humanity, but 
would be repugnant to the nature of both govern-
ments,” he insisted. “There is no principle better es-
tablished by the common law, none more fully recog-
nized in the federal and State constitutions, than 
that an individual shall not be put in jeopardy twice 
for the same offence.” Id. at 439 (McLean, J., dissent-
ing). 
The Court took its second step toward dual sover-
eignty two years later, in United States v. Marigold. 
Marigold was the inverse of Fox: the defendant had 
been convicted of counterfeiting in federal court, and 
he argued that state jurisdiction over counterfeiting 
was exclusive. The Court dispensed with this argu-
ment unanimously in a short opinion. Toward the 
end, the Court characterized Fox as having stated 
that “the same act might, as to its character and 
tendencies, and the consequences it involved, consti-
tute an offence against both the State and Federal 
governments, and might draw to its commission the 
penalties denounced by either.” Marigold, 50 U.S. at 
569. 
Moore v. Illinois, the third case, involved a state 
conviction for harboring a fugitive slave, and was 
thus exactly the kind of case that raised worries 
about allowing a state prosecution to bar a subse-
quent federal prosecution. The defendant was the 
prominent Illinois abolitionist Richard Eells. (Eells 









died while the case was pending; Moore was his ex-
ecutor.) Eells was the president of the Illinois Anti-
Slavery Party and the party’s candidate for governor 
in 1846. He lived in Quincy, just a few blocks from 
the Mississippi River, across which lay the slave 
state of Missouri. His house was the first stop on the 
Underground Railroad for slaves escaping from Mis-
souri. Eells was caught trying to hide a slave named 
Charley, who had swum across the river. He was 
convicted under state law of harboring a fugitive 
slave.2 
The case attracted a great deal of attention, be-
cause of the intense controversy surrounding the 
question of how much power free states possessed to 
regulate the capture of fugitive slaves. Eells was 
represented by Salmon Chase, the future Chief Jus-
tice. Chase was then a Senator and one of the most 
well-known abolitionists in the country. He relied on 
Prigg to argue that federal jurisdiction with respect 
to fugitive slaves was exclusive, on the theory that if 
states lacked the power to impede the return of fugi-
tive slaves to their owners, states should also lack 
the power to promote the return of fugitive slaves by 
prosecuting those who helped the slaves escape. 
Moore, 55 U.S. at 14-15. 
As part of Chase’s argument that only the federal 
government had the power to punish the harboring 
of fugitive slaves, he contended that federal jurisdic-
tion had to be exclusive, or else a person might be 
unconstitutionally punished twice for the same of-
fense. Id. at 19. But the issue of fugitive slaves pre-
                                                 
2 National Park Service, Dr. Richard Eells House, 
https://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/underground/il3.htm. 









sented the worst possible context for invoking the 
traditional one-prosecution rule. The difficulty with 
the rule was that it could empower a state to nullify 
federal policy by beating the federal government to 
the courthouse, and slavery was the one area in 
which states clearly would make that attempt if they 
could.3 
The Court thus had an especially pressing policy 
reason in Moore v. Illinois to reject Chase’s invoca-
tion of the one-prosecution rule. The Court ad-
dressed the issue at length. “An offence, in its legal 
signification, means the transgression of a law,” the 
Court began. 
Every citizen of the United States is also a citi-
zen of a State or territory. He may be said to 
owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be 
liable to punishment for an infraction of the 
laws of either. The same act may be an offence 
or transgression of the laws of both. Thus, an 
assault upon the marshal of the United States, 
and hindering him in the execution of legal 
process, is a high offence against the United 
States, for which the perpetrator is liable to 
punishment; and the same act may also be a 
gross breach of the peace of the State, a riot, 
assault, or a murder, and subject the same per-
son to a punishment, under the State laws, for 
a misdemeanor or felony. That either or both 
may (if they see fit) punish such an offender, 
cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly 
                                                 
3 The recently-enacted Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, like its 1793 
predecessor, made it a federal crime to obstruct the recapture 
of a fugitive slave, 9 Stat. 462, 464 (1850), so it did not change 
anyone’s incentive in this respect. 









averred that the offender has been twice pun-
ished for the same offence; but only that by one 
act he has committed two offences, for each of 
which he is justly punishable. He could not 
plead the punishment by one in bar to a convic-
tion by the other. 
Id. at 19-20. In this passage, the Court made clear 
that northern states could not nullify the Fugitive 
Slave Act by conducting sham prosecutions of their 
own. To do so, however, the Court had to elaborate a 
dual sovereignty doctrine that was exactly the oppo-
site of the way the Double Jeopardy Clause had been 
understood since the Founding. 
C. In United States v. Lanza, the Court was 
concerned less with the original meaning 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause than with 
rampant disregard of Prohibition. 
In subsequent years, when the issue arose, the 
Court did not discuss or cite Houston or Furlong, its 
pair of 1820 cases stating that a prosecution by one 
sovereign would bar a subsequent prosecution by all 
others. See Houston, 18 U.S. at 31; United States v. 
Furlong, 18 U.S. 184, 197 (1820) (“there can be no 
doubt that the plea of autre fois acquit would be good 
in any civilized State, though resting on a prosecu-
tion instituted in the Courts of any other civilized 
State.”). The Court merely cited its 1847-52 trilogy of 
Fox, Marigold, and Moore, and subsequent cases 
that rested on them. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 
371, 390 (1879) (citing Fox, Marigold, and Moore); 
Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U.S. 131, 139 (1889) 
(citing Fox, Marigold, and Moore); Pettibone v. Unit-
ed States, 148 U.S. 197, 209 (1893) (citing Cross); 









Crossley v. California, 168 U.S. 640, 641 (1898) (cit-
ing Cross); Southern Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 236 
U.S. 439, 445 (1915) (citing Cross); Gilbert v. Minne-
sota, 254 U.S. 325, 330 (1920) (citing Moore); McKel-
vey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 358-59 (1922) (cit-
ing Moore). 
Between Moore in 1852 and Bartkus in 1959, the 
Court addressed the issue at length only once. The 
defendants in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 
(1922) were charged under the then-new Volstead 
Act, the federal Prohibition statute, with manufac-
turing and possessing liquor. They had already been 
convicted of the same offenses in Washington state 
court, as Washington had a prohibition law of its 
own. They moved to dismiss the federal indictment 
on the ground that it was barred by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. 
When the case reached this Court, the defendants 
received abysmal representation. Their counsel filed 
a meandering brief, the argument of which was quite 
hard to discern, a brief that did not seem to question 
the dual sovereignty doctrine. See Brief for the De-
fendants in Error, United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 
377 (1922). Even Solicitor General James Beck was 
stumped. “If I correctly understand the argument of 
the counsel for the defendant,” Beck politely began, 
“he does not question the power of the Federal Gov-
ernment . . . to punish cumulatively a citizen who by 
the same act has transgressed both the State laws 
prohibiting the manufacture or traffic in liquor and 
the national laws.” Reply Brief for Plaintiff in Error 
at 1, United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). 
Beck understood Lanza’s counsel to be arguing mere-
ly that the intent of Congress in the Volstead Act 









was that a liquor manufacturer should not be pun-
ished under federal law if he had already been pun-
ished under state law. Id. This was a very weak con-
tention. “It is enough to say,” Beck replied, “that no 
section of the Volstead law contains, either expressly 
or by implication, any such release of liability.” Id. at 
1-2. The Court understood Lanza’s counsel to be 
making a different argument: that when states pro-
hibited liquor they were acting under the authority 
of the Eighteenth Amendment rather than their own 
inherent police power, and that a state prosecution 
for manufacturing liquor was therefore tantamount 
to a federal prosecution. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 379-80. 
This too was a very weak contention, which the 
Court rejected unanimously. Id. at 380-82. 
The United States was thus the only party in 
Lanza to make a coherent argument about dual sov-
ereignty. Before even mentioning any of the cases, 
the government’s brief emphasized that a one-
prosecution rule would allow a state to nullify na-
tional Prohibition. “[I]t is quite obvious that State 
and Nation may widely and quite naturally differ” in 
their views of Prohibition, Beck noted. Brief for the 
United States at 4, United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 
377 (1922). It was common knowledge that different 
parts of the country had radically different attitudes 
toward alcohol. In New York, for example, there was 
massive disregard of Prohibition right from the 
start. Michael A. Lerner, Dry Manhattan: Prohibi-
tion in New York City (2007). The potential for nulli-
fication was obvious, if a state prosecution barred a 
subsequent federal prosecution. “The State, taking 
into consideration the more drastic and far-reaching 
penalties of the Federal law, might content itself 









with imposing small or even nominal fines,” the gov-
ernment’s brief worried. Brief for the United States 
at 4. “As the sentiment for the enforcement of prohi-
bition laws is believed to be inactive in some States, 
especially in some subdivisions thereof, it would fol-
low that the State courts would virtually become in 
some localities ‘cities of refuge’ . . . from the effective 
action of the Federal Government.” Id. at 5. If boot-
leggers flocked to New York and other “wet” cities, 
“[t]he nominal fines of a local magistrate, perhaps 
only a justice of the peace, might become the boot-
legger’s ‘benefit of clergy.’” Id. at 5. The government 
repeated this concern in its reply brief. “[A]s there is 
now a wide difference of opinion in various States 
with respect to the wisdom and justice of prohibi-
tion,” the government cautioned, “it will follow that, 
in the States that are called ‘wet,’ the offender, by 
submitting to nominal punishments, will escape the 
rigor of the Federal laws.” Reply Brief for Plaintiff in 
Error at 13. 
The Court’s opinion in Lanza duly noted all the 
cases establishing dual sovereignty, beginning with 
the trilogy of 1847-52, Fox, Marigold, and Moore. 
Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382-84. As usual, the Court did 
not mention any sources before 1847. Lanza’s inept 
counsel had not cited them. (The United States cited 
Furlong, not Houston, and erroneously described 
Furlong as involving “questions of discretion, not of 
power.” Brief for the United States at 18-19 (refer-
ring to Furlong by its informal name, U.S. v. Pi-
rates).) 
Toward the end of its opinion in Lanza, the Court 
acknowledged the concern about Prohibition en-
forcement that had been emphasized by the Solicitor 









General. “If a state were to punish the manufacture, 
transportation and sale of intoxicating liquor by 
small or nominal fines,” the Court explained, “the 
race of offenders to the courts of that state to plead 
guilty and secure immunity from federal prosecution 
for such acts would not make for respect for the fed-
eral statute.” Lanza, 260 U.S. at 385. Prohibition, 
like slavery, was an issue as to which states were 
certain to nullify federal policy if they were given 
half a chance. The purpose of dual sovereignty was 
to cut off that opportunity. 
* * * 
The lesson from this story is that dual sovereignty 
was not part of the constitutional design. It is an ac-
cident of history. It is a doctrine the Court created 
during the slavery crisis that led to the Civil War, 
and one the Court reinforced during Prohibition. In 
both instances, the Court was responding to the 
pressing political issues of the day rather than tak-
ing the longer view that constitutional interpretation 
often requires. 
The Court’s inattention to the early sources has 
become particularly unfortunate in recent years, as 
the Court has paid closer attention to the original 
meaning of the constitutional protections for crimi-
nal defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 
S. Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012); Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 42-56 (2004). Defendants today have 
weaker double jeopardy protection than they did at 
the Founding, when the Double Jeopardy Clause 
was understood to bar successive prosecutions by all 
sovereigns, not just the sovereign that prosecuted 









first. If judges can weaken constitutional protections 
for policy reasons that seem pressing at the time, 
one wonders what the Constitution is for. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be 
reversed. 
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